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(2005) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4).
Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of "corporality' and "alerting capacity'
John O'Regan, Erik Myin , Alva Noë
pp. 369-387
How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do not. We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-005-9000-0
Full citation:
O'Regan, J. , Myin, E. , Noë, A. (2005). Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of "corporality' and "alerting capacity'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4), pp. 369-387.
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