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(2005) Continental Philosophy Review 38 (1-2).
Most contemporary readings of Derrida's work situate it within a transcendental tradition of philosophical enquiry explicitly critical of naturalistic accounts of knowledge and mind. I argue that Derrida provides the naturalist with some of the philosophical resources needed to rebut transcendental critiques of naturalism, in particular the phenomenological critiques which derive from Husserl's philosophy. I do this by showing: a) that Derrida's account of temporality as differance undermines phenomenological accounts of the meaning of naturalistic theories and assumptions; and b) that it is itself both usable and interpretable within the naturalistic framework of current cognitive science.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11007-005-9004-z
Full citation:
Roden, D. (2005). Naturalising deconstruction. Continental Philosophy Review 38 (1-2), pp. 71-88.
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