Repository | Book | Chapter
(2004) Gurwitsch's relevancy for cognitive science, Dordrecht, Springer.
Intentionality, consciousness, and intentional relations
from phenomenology to cognitive science
John Barresi
pp. 79-93
In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the intentionality of consciousness, both with respect to the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I show that these recent trends tend to naturalize intentionality and consciousness in directions compatible with the descriptive aspects of Gurwitsch's constitutive phenomenology.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-2892-2_4
Full citation:
Barresi, J. (2004)., Intentionality, consciousness, and intentional relations: from phenomenology to cognitive science, in L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's relevancy for cognitive science, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 79-93.
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