The vertical intentionality of time-consciousness and sense-giving
In my "The Transcendental Reflection of Life without a Transcendental Ego,"1 I argue that the agent of transcendental reflection is not the so-called transcendental ego, but life itself; that transcendental reflection is a derivative mode of the originally non-reflective consciousness of life and therefore, that the phenomenological reduction, as the methodic basis of the phenomenological approach to the matter itself, should have not only a reflective component but also a non-reflective, (non-positional) stance in relation to life itself. In other words, the psychological ego of Husserl or rather "life-ego" (I prefer this locution in order to stress the ego's relation to the life-world) is not the transcendental ego's worldly self-objectivation, as Husserl thought, but rather a type of being in the world whose self-awareness is, at once, both reflectively and non-reflectively conscious.
Kojima, H. (1997)., The vertical intentionality of time-consciousness and sense-giving, in B. C. Hopkins (ed.), Husserl in contemporary context, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 79-93.
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