The relation as the fundamental issue in Derrida
Of all the aspects of Derrida's thought, his interpretation of Husserl has occasioned the most debate.1 Although all of Derrida's critics start out wanting to understand him—none, for instance, claim to do anything as extraordinary as "deconstruction"—none adhere to one of the most basic hermeneutical rules: reconstruct the context. Because critics neglect the context, some charge Derrida with interpreting Husserlian phenomenology merely as ontologism and intuitionism, in a word, as Platonism.2 They do this despite the fact that Derrida has repeatedly stated his allegiance to transcendental philosophy.3 Others charge him with failing "to recognize the subtleties of Husserl's account of the interplay of presence and absence, of immanence and transcendence, of filled and empty intention,"4 even though Derrida appropriates precisely these subtleties to criticize the so-called "metaphysics of presence" he nevertheless finds in Husserl. The one-sidedness of such charges is startling. Perhaps however the critics' negligence can be excused; to assemble all the parts of the Derridean context is an immense task. Roughly the context can be divided into two parts, and even these two do not exhaust it.
Lawlor, L. (1995)., The relation as the fundamental issue in Derrida, in J. C. Evans (ed.), Derrida and phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 151-184.
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