Hegel's critique of psychologism
At the end of his masterful study Frege: The Philosophy of Language, Michael Dummett, the doyen of Frege scholarship, argues with a certain modicum of self-assurance that idealism, especially Hegel's, "is by its very nature prone to slip into psychologism, although the possibility of a viable idealistic theory of meaning depends precisely upon the possibility of resisting this temptation."1 Dummett claims furthermore that in "Frege's day the kind of idealism that was everywhere prevalent in the philosophical schools was infected with psychologism through and through. [So] it was not until it had been decisively overthrown that it became possible to envisage a non-psychologistic version of idealism."2 For Dummett, Frege presides over the requiem of idealism through his critique of psychologism, a critique which, by implication, would toss Hegel's idealism into the historical litter basket that, in Dummett's view, so obviously yawns for it.3
Kirkland, F.M. (1993)., Hegel's critique of psychologism, in F. M. Kirkland & D. P. Chattopadhyaya (eds.), Phenomenology: East and West, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 219-244.
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