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(1993) Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger, Dordrecht, Springer.

The intentionality of logical significance and material ontological meaning

Burt C. Hopkins

pp. 32-43

In Chapter Two of my study of Husserl's phenomenological account of intentionality, I will be concerned with bringing into relief the phenomenal state of affairs that lead him to differentiate, not only the intentional structure of logical signification (Bedeutung) from the intentional structure of material ontological meaning (Sinn), but also to maintain an exclusive philosophical importance for the latter. I find this state of affairs to be extremely important on at least two counts.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8145-5_3

Full citation:

Hopkins, B.C. (1993). The intentionality of logical significance and material ontological meaning, in Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 32-43.

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