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(1995) From Dedekind to Gödel, Dordrecht, Springer.

Gödel and Husserl

Dagfinn Føllesdal

pp. 427-446

… just because of the lack of clarity and the literal incorrectness of many of Kant’s formulations, quite divergent directions have developed out of Kant’s thought — none of which, however, really did justice to the core of Kant’s thought. This requirement seems to me to be met for the first time by phenomenology, which, entirely as intended by Kant, avoids both the death-defying leaps of idealism into a new metaphysics as well as the positivistic rejection of all metaphysics. But now, if the misunderstood Kant has already led to so much that is interesting in philosophy, and also indirectly in science, how much more can we expect it from Kant understood correctly?2

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8478-4_16

Full citation:

Føllesdal, D. (1995)., Gödel and Husserl, in J. Hintikka (ed.), From Dedekind to Gödel, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 427-446.

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