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(2002) History of philosophy of science, Dordrecht, Springer.
the concept of cause cannot arise in this [empiricist] way at all, but must either be grounded in the understanding completely a priori or else be entirely surrendered as a mere fantasy of the brain. For this concept always requires that something A be of such a kind that something else B follows from it necessarily and in accordance with an absolutely universal rule. Appearances may well offer cases from which a rule is possible in accordance with which something usually happens, but never a rule in accordance with which the succession is necessary; thus to the synthesis of cause and effect there belongs a dignity that can never be expressed empirically, namely that the effect does not merely come along with the cause, but is posited through it and follows from it. [A 91/B 123-4]
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-1785-4_6
Full citation:
Anderson, R. J. (2002)., Kant on the apriority of causal laws, in M. Heidelberger & F. Stadler (eds.), History of philosophy of science, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 67-80.
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