Repository | Book | Chapter

178358

(2011) Ethics and self-knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer.

Stereotyping

Peter Lucas

pp. 53-63

Chapter 3 argued that discrimination is distinguishable from other forms of injustice because it embodies, and puts to work, an interpretation of its victims. In discrimination individuals are systematically disadvantaged as members of independently identifiable groups. Nevertheless, there are contexts (such as selling insurance ) in which it is considered permissible to make such judgements about individuals, which lead to their being systematically disadvantaged, but which we do not consider discriminatory. Consideration of these potential counterexamples highlights the role of stereotyping in discrimination. In addition to being a factor in discrimination, stereotyping proves to be an interpretive moral wrong in its own right. Stereotyped judgements made about individuals as members of identifiable social groups may be true or false, but are not morally innocent on the condition that they are true, since they may involve judging individuals on the basis of factors that affect them only as a matter of regrettable historical contingency.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-1560-8_4

Full citation:

Lucas, P. (2011). Stereotyping, in Ethics and self-knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 53-63.

This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.