Repository | Book | Chapter
(2012) Dummett on abstract objects, Dordrecht, Springer.
Dummett's intermediate position on abstract objects combines his early critique of nominalism with his later scepticism concerning the capacity of the context principle to legitimize a robust notion of reference for abstract singular terms. The rationale for Dummett's rejection of a strong interpretation of the context principle as a thesis about reference is set out in his critique of the neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics found in the work of Crispin Wright and Bob Hale.1 According to Dummett, while Wright and Hale are correct to view Frege's context principle as providing a means of overcoming nominalist scruples about our epistemic access to abstract objects, this does not legitimize the attribution of a "full-blown' reference to abstract singular terms. In the current section I critically outline the neo-Fregean position; in doing so I prepare the way for a consideration in the following section of Wright and Hale's critique of Dummett.
Publication details
Full citation:
Duke, G. (2012). Tolerant reductionism, in Dummett on abstract objects, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 117-144.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.