Springer, Dordrecht


372 Pages

ISBN 978-94-007-6933-5

Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality
vol. 2

Institutions, emotions, and group agents

contributions to social ontology

Edited by

Anita Konzelmann-Ziv, Hans Bernhard Schmid

The contributions gathered in this volume present the state of the art in key areas of current social ontology. They focus on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts, and on the nature of intentional properties of groups that allow characterizing them as responsible agents, or perhaps even as persons. Many of the essays are inspired by contemporary action theory, emotion theory, and theories of collective intentionality. Another group of essays revisits early phenomenological approaches to socialontology and accounts of sociality that draw on the Hegelian idea of recognition.

This volume is organized into three parts. First, the volume discusses themes highlighted in John Searle's work and addresses questions concerning the relation between intentions and the deontic powers of institutions, the role of disagreement, and the nature of collective intentionality. Next, the book focuses on joint and collective emotions and mutual recognition, and then goes on to explore the scope and limits of group agency, or group personhood, especially the capacity for responsible agency.

The variety of philosophical traditions mirrored in this collection provides readers with a rich and multifaceted survey of present research in social ontology. It will help readers deepen their understanding of three interrelated and core topics in social ontology: the constitution and structure of institutions, the role of shared evaluative attitudes, and the nature and role of group agents.

Publication details

Full citation:

Konzelmann-Ziv, A. , Schmid, H.B. (eds) (2014). Institutions, emotions, and group agents: contributions to social ontology, Springer, Dordrecht.

Table of Contents


Schmid Hans Bernhard; Konzelmann-Ziv Anita


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Document acts

Smith Barry


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Social objects without intentions

Epstein Brian


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Groups, normativity and disagreement

Sánchez Brigido Rodrigo E.


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Three types of heterotropic intentionality

De Vecchi Francesca


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Emergence and empathy

de Sousa Ronald


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Feelings of being-together and caring-with

Héctor Andrés Sánchez Guerrero


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Joining the background

Caminada Emanuele


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The conditions of collectivity

Stahl Titus


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Acting over time, acting together

Bratman Michael


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How where we stand constrains where i stand

Kisolo-Ssonko Joseph


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Team reasoning and shared intention

Abraham Sesshu Roth


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Direct and indirect common belief

Lorini Emiliano; Herzig Andreas


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