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(2013) In defense of intuitions, Dordrecht, Springer.

[W]e will understand by a priori cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur absolutely independently of all experience. Opposed to these are empirical cognitions, or those that are possible only a posteriori, i.e., through experience.... Experience teaches us, to be sure, that something is constituted thus and so, but not that it could not be otherwise. First, then, if a proposition is thought along with its necessity, then it is an a priori judgment;.... Second: Experience never gives its judgments true or strict but only assumed and comparative universality (through induction), so properly it must be said: as far as we have perceived, there is no exception to this or that rule. Thus if a judgment is thought in strict universality, i.e., in such a way that no exception is allowed to be possible, then it is not derived from experience, but is rather valid absolutely a priori.... Necessity and strict universality are therefore secure indicators (Kennzeichen) of an a priori cognition, and also belong together inseparably. But since in their use it is sometimes easier to show the empirical limitation in judgments than contingency in them, or is often more plausible to show the unrestricted universality that we ascribe to a judgment than its necessity, it is advisable to employ separately these two criteria, each of which is infallible.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1057/9781137347954_9

Full citation:

Chapman, A. , Ellis, A. , Hanna, R. , Hildebrand, T. , Pickford, (2013). What is a priori knowledge?, in In defense of intuitions, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 178-219.

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