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(2013) In defense of intuitions, Dordrecht, Springer.
Rational intuitions and the irrelevance of experimental philosophy
Andrew Chapman , Addison Ellis , Robert Hanna , Tyler Hildebrand , Henry Pickford
pp. 233-245
Philosophical intuition. .. is e piste mo logically useless, since it can be calibrated only when it is not needed. Once we are in a position to identify artifacts and errors in intuition, philosophy no longer has any use for it. Moreover, the most plausible account of the origins of philosophical intuitions is that they derive from tacit theories that are very likely to be inaccurate. There is a sense, then, in which philosophical intuitions can always be "explained away": when a dispute arises, I can always, with some plausibility, suppose your intuitions are the artifacts of bad tacit theory. This is a game everyone can play, and I think we should all play it. We should, that is, dismiss philosophical intuitions as epistemologically valueless.
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Full citation:
Chapman, A. , Ellis, A. , Hanna, R. , Hildebrand, T. , Pickford, (2013). Rational intuitions and the irrelevance of experimental philosophy, in In defense of intuitions, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 233-245.
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