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(2014) Virtue epistemology naturalized, Dordrecht, Springer.
David Hume (1748) famously said, "when anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened." Of course, intentionally deceptive information on many topics (not just reports of miracles) can interfere with our ability to achieve our epistemic goals of acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. Thus, it would be beneficial to reduce the spread of such disinformation. In order to do this, we need to identify what sorts of things affect the amount of disinformation and how they affect it. Toward this end, I offer an analysis of what disinformation is. I then use this analysis to develop a game-theoretic model (which is inspired by the work of Elliott Sober and of Brian Skyrms and which appeals to philosophical work on epistemic values) of the sending and receiving of disinformation.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_10
Full citation:
Fallis, D. (2014)., Epistemic values and disinformation, in A. Fairweather (ed.), Virtue epistemology naturalized, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 159-179.
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