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In this paper I would like to talk about the speech-act of identifying reference ("referring', for short), and the way of having an object in mind which Quine terms "relational belief'.¹ These two notions admit of parallel causal theories. For relational belief, the view is that such a belief concerning individual r requires a causal connection between r and the psychological state constituting the belief. For referring, the view is that the speech-act requires a causal connection between the given act and the individual thereby referred to. These two causal theories are related: given a Gricean (or Searlean) characterization of the speech-act of referring, the causal theory of relational belief entails the causal theory of referring. The argument is this: If we characterize referring as an act of meaning — à la Grice and Searle — then for speaker S to refer to referent r, S must have some complex intention concerning r. Moreover, this will be a relational intention concerning r; this is clearly required by the transparent occurrence of "r' in "S is referring to r'² A relational intention concerning r requires a relational belief concerning r. Hence, for S to refer to r, S must have a relational belief concerning r. In this way, then, given the causal theory of relational belief we have as well the causal theory of referring.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-8377-9_5

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