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It is argued that the existence of a fluent time with a past, a present, and a future is linked to the existence of experiential points of view with non-conceptual contents. There cannot be a fluent time without points of view with non-conceptual contents, and there cannot be such points of view without a fluent time. The main components and consequences of these ideas are analysed. The non-conceptual contents of our experience are tensed entities capable of making true some tensed truths. A crucial distinction is assumed among being external to all points of view, being internal to some points of view, and being internal to the subjects having those points of view. Fluent time would be internal to some points of view without being internal to the subjects. That way, even if fluent time cannot be placed in the physical world, such as that physical world is conceptualised by our physical sciences, it could not be said to be merely subjective either. The notion of a fluent time, always internal to our experiential points of view, is also distinguished from the notion of having a temporal point of view. Temporal points of view are a peculiar kind of, in a certain sense reflective, points of view. It is by adopting some temporal points of view that we come both to identify a fluent time and to be able to postulate a physical time.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-19815-6_4

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