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On Kant, Frege, analyticity and the theory of reference

Richard Milton Martin

pp. 407-414

One of the most famous passages in the Critique of Pure Reason — among logicians anyhow — is that in the Introduction concerned with the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. This passage seems not to have been commented on to any extent, however, by proponents of the modern semantical theory of reference, stemming from the work of Frege, Carnap, and Tarski. History must continually be looked at in the light of present knowledge, as Whitehead has suggested. The modest task of the present paper is merely to examine Kant's distinction in the light of modern semantics.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-3099-1_39

Full citation:

Martin, R.M. (1972)., On Kant, Frege, analyticity and the theory of reference, in L. White Beck (ed.), Proceedings of the Third international Kant congress, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 407-414.

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