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(2018) Philosophy & Technology 31 (4).
The ever-increasing application of algorithms to decision-making in a range of social contexts has prompted demands for algorithmic accountability. Accountable decision-makers must provide their decision-subjects with justifications for their automated system's outputs, but what kinds of broader principles should we expect such justifications to appeal to? Drawing from political philosophy, I present an account of algorithmic accountability in terms of the democratic ideal of "public reason". I argue that situating demands for algorithmic accountability within this justificatory framework enables us to better articulate their purpose and assess the adequacy of efforts toward them.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s13347-017-0263-5
Full citation:
Binns, R. (2018). Algorithmic accountability and public reason. Philosophy & Technology 31 (4), pp. 543-556.
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