The ordinary concept of weakness of will

Ali Yousefi Heris

pp. 123-139

Recently, a number of experimental philosophers have converged on the position that the ordinary concept of weakness of will does not solely consist in "judgment" or "intention" violation but is more like a cluster concept in which each factor plays contributory roles in the application of the concept. This, however, raises the question as to which factor is more central or plays a more significant role in folk's understanding of the concept. I contend that the ordinary concept of weakness of will is primarily constituted by the "executive commitment" rather than the "evaluative commitment" practices. Drawing on extensive evidence from developmental psychology, I will argue that the executive commitment, which, as I will show, involve intention recognition and metarepresentation, is developmentally prior and more fundamental in our exercise and intuitive understanding of the concept.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-019-09617-6

Full citation:

Yousefi Heris, A. (2020). The ordinary concept of weakness of will. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (1), pp. 123-139.

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