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(2018) Synthese 195 (9).
Objective standards for justification or for being a reason would be desirable, but inductive skepticism tells us that they cannot be presupposed. Rather, we have to start from subjective-relative notions of justification and of being a reason. The paper lays out the strategic options we have given this dilemma. The paper explains the requirements for this subject-relative notion and how they may be satisfied. Then it discusses four quite heterogeneous ways of providing more objective standards, which combine without guaranteeing complete success.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1393-0
Full citation:
Spohn, W. (2018). Epistemic justification: its subjective and its objective ways. Synthese 195 (9), pp. 3837-3856.
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