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(2013) Synthese 190 (15).
In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976)), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007)). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of Hintikka’s Socratic epistemology.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0132-9
Full citation:
Martini, C. (2013). A puzzle about belief updating. Synthese 190 (15), pp. 3149-3160.
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