Repository | Journal | Volume | Articles
(2009) Synthese 171 (1).
Robert Hanna (Rationality and logic. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006) articulates and defends the thesis of logical cognitivism, the claim that human logical competence is grounded in a cognitive faculty (in Chomsky’s sense) that is not naturalistically explicable. This position is intended to steer us between the Scylla of logical Platonism and the Charybdis of logical naturalism (/psychologism). The paper argues that Hanna’s interpretation of Chomsky is mistaken. Read aright, Chomsky’s position offers a defensible version of naturalism, one Hanna may accept as far as his version of naturalism goes, although not one that supports the claim that cognitive science offers a place for logic that is somehow outside the natural, contingent order.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-008-9391-x
Full citation:
Collins, J. (2009). The limits of conceivability: logical cognitivism and the language faculty. Synthese 171 (1), pp. 175-194.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.