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(2006) Synthese 149 (1).
A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some important positions in the philosophy of mind. We could embrace radical skepticism about our own consciousness, or maintain the complete and total infallibility of our beliefs about our own phenomenal experiences. I argue that we should actually reject the logical possibility of zombies.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-004-6241-3
Full citation:
Lynch, M. P. (2006). Zombies and the case of the phenomenal pickpocket. Synthese 149 (1), pp. 37-58.
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