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(1998) Synthese 116 (2).

Leibniz on intension, extension, and the representation of syllogistic inference

O. Bradley Bassler

pp. 117-139

New light is shed on Leibniz’s commitment to the metaphysical priority of the intensional interpretation of logic by considering the arithmetical and graphical representations of syllogistic inference that Leibniz studied. Crucial to understanding this connection is the idea that concepts can be intensionally represented in terms of properties of geometric extension, though significantly not the simple geometric property of part-whole inclusion. I go on to provide an explanation for how Leibniz could maintain the metaphysical priority of the intensional interpretation while holding that logically the intensional and the extensional stand in strictly inverse relation to each other.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1023/A:1005076530958

Full citation:

Bassler, O. (1998). Leibniz on intension, extension, and the representation of syllogistic inference. Synthese 116 (2), pp. 117-139.

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