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Heinrich Rickert's critique of the standpoint of immanence

Tomasz Kubalica

pp. 79-94

The purpose of this paper is to present the evolution of Heinrich Rickert’s critical position on the standpoint of immanence [Standpunkt der Immanenz]. Under the pressure of criticism, his position has evolved, which can be observed in successive editions of his most important work Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis [The Object of Knowledge] (21904, 31915, 4-51921 and 61928). I agree with the findings of Iso Kern; indeed, his conclusions could put an end to this purely terminological dispute that does not contribute much to the understanding of the problem. On this point, Husserl, in principle, agrees with Rickert on the rejection of the position of immanence, although he differs in his understanding of transcendence.

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Full citation:

Kubalica, (2022)., Heinrich Rickert's critique of the standpoint of immanence, in E. Martin, M. Mrugalski & P. Flack (eds.), Neo-Kantianism as an entanglement of intellectual cultures in Central and Eastern Europe, Genève-Lausanne, sdvig press, pp. 79-94.


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1Heinrich Rickert addressed a fundamental epistemological and ontological problem of realism-idealism by asking a basic question about the object of knowledge: do the objects given in knowledge exist independently of the subject of knowledge? This epistemological question has significant consequences in the form of ontological realism, i.e., the position that recognises the existence of an objective reality that is transcendent in relation to the knowing subject and independent of the acts of consciousness. The position taken on the problem of realism-idealism also has important consequences for other fields of philosophy, specifically for the philosophy of science, in which one of the fundamental questions is whether directly observable objects postulated by scientific theories literally exist or are only useful conventions introduced to predict phenomena at the empirical level. The problem of realism-idealism, therefore, has important consequences for all areas of theoretical and practical philosophy, as well as for scientific knowledge.

2Generally, it can be said that the philosophical standpoint of immanence is typical of modern philosophy, in contrast to pre-modern philosophy of transcendence. Its source can be found in René Descartes, who found the basis for the certainty of knowledge in the immanence of the ego cogito. The pantheism of Baruch Spinoza, for whom God is immanent in the world as a causa sui, should also be mentioned. Immanuel Kant, for whom the theoretical possibilities of metaphysics should be resolved within the immanent limits of possible experience, made an equally important contribution. The next milestones in the philosophy of immanence are: the pheno|menology of Edmund Husserl, which asserts an immanent sphere of direct apprehension of the object and the presentation of transcendent nature in terms of immanent phenomena [Erscheinungen]; Karl Jaspersʼs philosophy of existence, for which Being, consciousness-as-such, and Spirit are three immanent ways of encompassing [Umgrei|fenden] the subject; and Gilles Deleuze, for whom immanence, as the basis of an ontology of difference, is identical with life. There are many more examples that illustrate the position of immanence in modern philosophy. As such, the aforementioned juxtaposition between idealism and realism is simultaneously a confrontation between immanence-oriented modern philosophy and a pre-modern philosophy that is strongly transcendence-oriented.

3The critical interest for the problem of the standpoint of immanence [Standpunkt der Immanenz] in Rickertʼs philosophy was initiated by critics from the phenomenological movement. As Iso Kern puts it, Edmund Husserl rejected the position of immanence, which he understood as the acceptance of a limitation to the real content of consciousness (reduction to experiences) (cf. Kern, 1964, 383). For Husserl, the theory of logical knowledge cannot be reduced to the analysis of experiences, as it must always take transcendence into account, even if Husserl acknowledges that in phenomenological description “all transcendent interpretations of immanent data [...] are entirely excluded” (Husserl 2001, 6). At the same time, Husserl recognises transcendence in every intentional object at the level of the theory of knowledge. On this point, Husserl agrees in principle with Rickert on the rejection of the position of immanence, although he differs in his understanding of transcendence. For Hus|serl, the object must be something that is there, whereas for Rickert not necessarily, as the object is only what makes knowledge valid. For him, the object that is there is always only immanent, and the proper transcendence is an object such as value or duty. These assumptions are a source of misunderstandings at the junction of Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology. The discussion is, therefore, a result of a misunderstanding and is of little relevance to the fundamental problem.

4I agree with the findings of Iso Kern; indeed, his conclusions could put an end to this purely terminological dispute that does not contribute much to the understanding of the problem. Nevertheless, Husserlʼs position initiated a number of other polemics on Rickertʼs philosophy from the point of view of realism, such as Kazimierz Ajdukiewiczʼs The Problem of Transcendental Idealism in Semantic Formulation [Problemat transcendentalnego idealizmu w sformułowa|niu semantycznym] (1937), which I discussed elsewhere (cf. Kubalica 2008). However, a critical approach to Rickertʼs position requires considering idealistic and realistic arguments. In my view, Ajdukie|wiczʼs paraphrase was only a specific generalisation of Rickertʼs views, focusing on the issue of the transcendental subject and omitting the issue of psychology and transcendental logic developed by Rickert. According to Ajdukiewicz, transcendental idealism is about reducing the whole real world (physical and mental) to being a correlate of consciousness in general: “However it is not a correlate of the consciousness of individuals but of consciousness in general (Bewusstsein überhaupt), not a correlate of the mental subject but of the transcendental subject” (Ajdukiewicz 1978, 148).

5In comparison with Rickertʼs views, this statement is too general to settle the matter. The text reveals a key difference between the semantic problem of transcendental idealism and transcendental philosophy. Ajdukiewicz makes only the former the object of his analyses, while he does not take up the problem of the latter. This presentation is a continuation of the reflection on Ajdukiewiczʼs polemics. I attempt to trace the evolution of Rickertʼs thought, which was subject to significant reformulation during his lifetime, and to undertake a logical analysis of his position.

6The concept of the standpoint of immanence [Standpunkt der Immanenz] appears in Rickertʼs reflections on epistemological realism in successive editions of Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis (19042, 19153, 19214–5 and 19286). In its second edition of 1904, it is the main theme of the second chapter. Rickert states that transcendence is often apparent and always requires immanence: “Rather, the standpoint of immanence proves to be the only possible one as long as we proceed from representational consciousness”.1

7In his opinion, transcendental philosophy can only begin with the opposition between consciousness and its immanent objects.

8Rickert is careful to defend the standpoint of immanence against the accusation of “absolute illusionism,” because he believes that it is realism rather than idealism that deserves this criticism, identifying the external world — in the naïve-realistic sense of the word — with an existing manifestation of things (cf. Rickert 2018 [1904], 2/1:43). This epistemological realism has a greater tendency to ignore directly experienced reality and to treat products of imagination as the only true reality. In his opinion, the naïve-realistic accusation of illusionism does not concern epistemological idealism (when taken seriously), or even the position of immanence. Rickert takes a similar stance against solipsism, which for him is an impossible position to hold on the basis of the concept of consciousness-as-such [Bewußtsein überhaupt] (cf. Rickert 2018 [1904], 2/1:50). The world cannot be the content of my consciousness, because consciousness cannot be an individual ego. Solipsism is a term devoid of reference and should be treated only as an intellectual play with words.

9Diltheyʼs principle of phenomenality can also be placed in this context: “The highest principle of philosophy is the principle of phenomenality: according to it, everything that is there for me is under the most general condition of being a factual matter of my consciousness”.2

10This means that even the most external things and objects are only processes of consciousness and as such, are combinations of facts. Diltheyʼs principle is equivalent to Rickertʼs principle of immanence as the basis of the standpoint of immanence, which is considered by Rickert as the only possible starting point for an assumption-free theory of knowledge, which aims to lead the object of knowledge out of the subject of cognition.

11Rickert does not agree with Diltheyʼs identification of phenomenalism with the standpoint of immanence due to his overintellectualised reinterpretation of phenomenalism, which is devoid of essential emotional and volitional elements (cf. Rickert 2018 [1904], 2/1:52). For Rickert, the sense of arbitrariness and resistance experienced in the act of will is essential, because it is the basis for the experience of what is independent of our will, that is, the “outside world.” However, Rickert notices here a mistake in a categorical shift of the kind of μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος. When searching for the concept of knowing, we ask about an object independent of the subject, and here we have independence which is dependent on the whole of the willing and inhibited human being, even if this is possible only conceptually, in abstraction. Abstract thinking is not a charge against the position of immanence. Rickert notes that the occurrence of impulses and inhibitions is nothing else than the content of consciousness, and that such a world, supposedly independent of the subject, becomes an immanent object. On this view, there is no reality independent of the knowing subject, because: “The will ensures a world independent of the subject only as long as it is wanted, not if it is considered theoretically”.3

12In this way, Rickert comes to the paradoxical conclusion that: “We have not yet learnt any reason that would make us abandon this standpoint of immanence”.4

13The only reality is the “naïve” space-time sensual world known to us all. However, this naïve belief should be complemented by the less naïve statement that “the being of every reality must be seen as a being in consciousness”,5 which is the expression of his standpoint of immanence as he sees it at that time.

14In his preface to the third edition, Rickert formulates a critical attitude towards the position of immanence (cf. Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:5). He explains that for him, the standpoint of immanence means identifying reality with the content of consciousness. Rickert defends himself against the groundless accusation of practising a philosophy of immanence by considering the first two chapters of Der Gegestand der Erkenntnis as negative and by pointing out that the third chapter concludes that the idealism of consciousness cannot be applied. Rickert sees the essence of his philosophy in the thesis that: “there is still another ‘other world’ than the immanent real one, namely, it lies in the sphere of value or confronts us as a ‘should’ that can never be traced back to a being”.6

15Rickertʼs basic conclusion is that there is a reality-independent (transcendent) dimension of values that constitute the ultimate basis of a theory in general, i.e., the title object of cognition. Rickertʼs basic assumption is a kind of dualism involving two worlds: the world of beings and the world of valid values. Therefore, nothing can be more wrong than treating Rickertʼs position as a kind of monistic philosophy of immanence.

16In the third edition, Rickert deals with the issue of the third pair of correlates, which expresses the relation of consciousness to the content of consciousness and identifies the standpoint of immanence with positivism (cf. Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:42). In this approach, the very existence of immanent objects does not give rise to any doubts, since “the immanent object and the consciousness subject necessarily belong together”,7 which indicates a correlativism characteristic of both immanence and positivism. Both positions are linked by the fact that they define as real only objects of imagination or the content of consciousness, i.e., what is directly given and experienced (cf. Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:47). Such a view corresponds to a certain kind of idealism, namely, the idealism of representation, because representation means an idea. Unless the concept of an idea is understood in the Platonic way as something supersensory, metaphysical, and transcendentally real – in this case, we arrive at the opposite of positivism and immanence (cf. Krijnen 2001, 174). The Kantian concept of ideas — to which Rickert himself refers — has a different meaning, though, and an idealistic philosophy oriented towards this concept is irreconcilable either with Platoʼs idealism, with the position of immanence, or with the idealism of representation.

17Rickert raises the question of the relationship between the standpoint of immanence and the concept of the subject. A subject in the sense of an individual, mental subject cannot be transcendent and must be immanent (cf. Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:76). This does not imply, however, accepting the standpoint of immanence, because the question of knowledge must be asked in relation not to individual consciousness, but to consciousness-as-such, i.e., to the epistemological subject, which for Rickert is an impersonal, supra-individual consciousness, identical with every individual ego. The subject understood in this way is not a real thing, but a formal assumption of all knowledge of reality: “the epistemological subject as a form of any subject or as ‘consciousness-as-such’ is neither a transcendent nor an immanent reality”.8 This does not yet mean a complete denial of the standpoint of immanence.

18In this context, Rickert refers to Broder Christiansen (1869–1958), who questions the understanding of the epistemological subject as a borderline concept (cf. Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:80). Christiansen argues that:

If one removes from the subject S everything empirical, then one is not left with a borderline concept of consciousness, or even a bare consciousness in contrast to all contents, but one reaches a pure nothing. Nothing remains of the subject that could serve as the bearer of a reality. 9

19If we remove all empirical content from the empirical subject, consciousness loses its ability to grasp reality from the standpoint of immanence because it no longer contains it. Responding to this accusation, Rickert distinguishes two relations: the relation of the epistemological subject to the individual empirical ego and the relation of the whole content of consciousness to consciousness-as-such as a form. He believes that we must have a unified form of the subject, which is a prerequisite for the concept of any subject, even an empirical one. Rickert stresses that: “The form of subjectivity, on the other hand, which is inherent in every subject, thus also in the empirical one, cannot at all be regarded as a part of reality”.10

20For Rickert, only an epistemological consciousness, free of any content, can accept any content that will be the object of knowledge of any epistemological subject.

21In the third edition, Rickert clearly emphasises the intention of the second chapter devoted to the standpoint of immanence, when he writes that: “Rather, the standpoint of immanence proves to be the only possible one as long as we proceed from the imagining consciousness or subject. But even this result is only temporary”.11

22The standpoint of immanence is, therefore, only a hypothetical standpoint, which is arrived at through misguided epistemological assumptions concerning the object of knowledge. For Rickert, the correct answer to the question about the possibility of transcendence in immanence is closely related to the well understood subject of knowledge in the sense of Kantian consciousness-as-such.

23For Rickert, the standpoint of immanence is the starting point for the study of cognitive activity; as an example, he invokes physiology, which proves that things are not immediately known in themselves, but are merely phenomena or signs (cf. Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:95–96). However, one should not stop here. It is necessary to assume, on the basis of the causality principle, that there are things in themselves, independent of the subject, that is, that there is a transcendent reality. We must, therefore, move from immanence to transcendence. Rickert argues as follows: “If we did not accept transcendent reality, the whole content of consciousness would have no cause, so for the standpoint of immanence, reality would be nothing less than a miracle”.12

24The content of the phenomena immanently given to us cannot be questioned, but it must be treated as the effect of something transcendent that exists in itself, regardless of any experience of the subject.

25He defends the epistemological idealism of the standpoint of immanence against the ad absurdum counter-argument that, according to this kind of idealism, life is a “dream” or an “illusion” (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:102). In his opinion, this is not a scientific argumentation but, at most, a poetic comparison based on naïve “common sense”. If epistemological idealism were to be a dream idealism, this would mean that things do not exist outside the idealistʼs body; such idealism would, therefore, have a purely physiological character, which is obvious nonsense based on the assumption that oneʼs own body, with its central nervous system, represents a different kind of being than the rest of the world. This could at most justify some kind of spiritualistic metaphysics, for which the apparent world of the senses is a product of the transcendent soul. However, in principle, the term “dream idealism” means the opposite of the standpoint of immanence, “because it means that the reality in which we live is not allowed to evaporate into the mere ‘phenomenon’ of a metaphysical being behind it”.13 The standpoint of immanence assumes that the only reality is the space of immanence and that there is no other true reality beyond this one. Rickert believes that the arguments of epistemological and metaphysical realism, based on the accusations of dream idealism and illusionism, miss the point if they are to strike at the epistemological idealism of the standpoint of immanence, because they do not rely on philosophical reasoning but only on naïve poetic comparisons. In any case, according to Rickert:

Idealistic transcendental philosophy strongly rejects any kinship with metaphysical games that deserve the name of dream idealism or illusionism, and therefore has the right to ignore all arguments directed against these games and refined arguments.14

26Rickert clearly sees the deficiencies of the standpoint of immanence when he states that: “The standpoint of immanence turns reality into a mass of irregular fragments”.15

27From the very standpoint of immanence, reality presents itself as “a completely irregular, discontinuous and constantly beginning game of representations”, in which there is no room at all for the continuity of events. Something continuous and real is missing to link together isolated and irregular elements of the content of consciousness and thus to bring order and unity to our experience. In order to develop a theory, it is therefore necessary to take over the transcendent elements that are not directly experienced or noticed and to “transform the collection of immanent fragments into a coherent whole of reality.”

28In the third edition, Rickert also rejects solipsism (cf. Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:111–12). In his opinion, the identification of reality with the content of the individual ego leads to a logical absurdity, because the ego cannot exist alone — as it might seem from the standpoint of immanence — but only in a social context. In other words, the true ego logically requires complementation by another true ego, that is, by a “You”, which is necessarily also an individual, though objectified, ego.

29Many misunderstandings about the standpoint of immanence have their source in the confusion of the notions of individual consciousness and consciousness-as-such. If space and time, colour and sound, or any other experience are considered to be the content of consciousness-as-such, i.e., immanent objects, then the question of their existence before and after consciousness, i.e., before birth and after death, is meaningless, because consciousness-as-such is not limited at all by the finiteness of human existence. Rickert explains the problem as follows:

Consciousness itself, however, considered on its own or separately from its immanent objects, is not a temporal thing, before or after which something can exist, and of which it can be said that it suffers interruptions, but merely a form of consciousness or a conceptually isolated subjective factor, which belongs to every content of consciousness, and is therefore unreal, like all forms without the content belonging to them.16

30The consciousness-as-such as an epistemological subject grasps reality regardless of its temporal and spatial dimensions and therefore must remain timeless and extra-spatial; it is only an unreal form necessary to make one aware of the content.

31Impersonal consciousness-as-such is a way for Rickert to avoid solipsism. In his opinion, this is because:

Anyone who only wants to recognise an individual consciousness and yet no reality independent of it, i.e., in this sense a ‘transcendent’ reality, expresses the logical absurdity of solipsism and is never able to go beyond it.17

32The mistake of solipsism lies in the fact that it treats an individual subject, which by its very nature has a relative character, as something absolute. In this context, Rickert repeats that solipsism cannot be identified with the philosophy of immanence. The philosophy of immanence, contrary to solipsism, does not exclude the existence of other subjects as the content of immanent consciousness. Idealism assumed by the standpoint of immanence and solipsism are mutually exclusive.

33Contrary to Dilthey’s view, the standpoint of immanence according to Rickert does not mean the same as phenomenalism (cf. Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:121). Phenomenalism means that the facts of consciousness are understood as consisting only of purely representational elements. Rickert considers this approach to be an unacceptable intellectual reinterpretation of the phenomenality principle. In his view, one has to consider the whole person with his or her will, urges, and feelings, because any justified division into internal and external worlds must originate from the whole human being. In this way, we obtain the correct opposition between the consciousness of arbitrary movements of the subject and the resistance of the object encountered. For Rickert, the concept of the cognitive subject is abstract and not concrete, as Dilthey wants it to be. Rickert justifies this position in the following way: “Only the reality independent of the knowing subject and not of the whole human being, which is to be the object of knowledge, may be called into doubt by epistemology”.18

34The point is that the standpoint of immanence makes sense only in an epistemological analysis of the object of knowledge, and not on the anthropological level, where human beings must be treated as a whole in their interactions with reality. According to Rickert, psychologism in epistemology leads to a resignation from the possibility of transcendental justification of knowledge: “For psychology, only the standpoint of immanence would remain”.19

35It is not possible to psychologically prove transcendence and therefore the standpoint of immanence cannot be the final stand in epistemology. Following this line of thinking, Rickert abandons the subjective path of transcendental psychology and seeks an answer to the question of the object of knowledge along an objective path.

36He diagnoses the cause of epistemological problems and finds it in terminological difficulties, specifically, in the ambiguity of the words consciousness and representation (cf. Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:132–33). In his opinion, they should be properly understood as acts of an epistemological subject that is constantly there or of consciousness-as-such, which are together a necessary condition for the possibility of existence of real objects appearing in consciousness. For Rickert, it is impossible to reconcile the thesis that “the world is my representation” with the standpoint of immanence. For the world is not the content of my consciousness, but the content of consciousness-as-such. Objectivity assumes that the world cannot be mine; thus, its conscious representation cannot be mine only, but is in some sense supra-individual, though not necessarily in the sense of the spirit of the world [Weltgeist], as in Descartes or Berkeley. Rickert defines consciousness in the following way:

The word consciousness, as we know, is to determine only the nature of being of everything immediately given, and to characterise the given in its totality as psychical, which would mean an ontological reinterpretation of its essence, for which there is no justification whatsoever.20

37Rickert approaches consciousness from a purely epistemological perspective and clearly avoids, perhaps unnecessarily, its ontologisation.

38In the combined edition of 1921, under the pressure of unfounded criticism, Rickert further emphasises his critical attitude towards the standpoint of immanence. In his preface to this issue, Rickert expresses the conviction that “my epistemological standpoint is in full harmony with the realism of individual research”.21 In his opinion, this conclusion becomes clear only in the last chapter of the book. The first two chapters, in which Rickert refers to the “idealism of representation” and the philosophy of immanence, are purely preparatory and temporary. In the third chapter, he explicitly rejects the position of immanence.


  • 1 «Es erweist sich vielmehr der Standpunkt der Immanenz, solange wir vom vorstellenden Bewusstsein ausgehen, als der einzig mögliche.» (Rickert 2018 [1904], 2/1:36; unless indicated otherwise, translations are mine, T.K.)
  • 2 “ Der oberste Satz der Philosophie ist der Satz der Phaenomenalität: nach diesem steht alles, was für mich da ist, unter der allgemeinsten Bedingung, Thatsache meines Bewusstseins zu sein. (Dilthey 1890)
  • 3 “ Der Wille sichert eine vom Subjekt unabhängige Welt nur, solange er gewollt, nicht wenn er theoretisch betrachtet wird. (Rickert 2018: 2/1)
  • 4 «Wir haben bisher keinen Grund kennen gelernt, der uns veranlassen könnte, diesen Standpunkt der Immanenz zu verlassen.» (Rickert 2018 [1904], 2/1:62)
  • 5 «das Sein jeder Wirklichkeit muss als ein Sein im Bewusstsein angesehen werden» (Rickert 2018 [1904], 2/1:62).
  • 6 «es gibt noch eine ‹andere Welt› als die immanente wirkliche, und zwar liegt sie in der Sphäre des Wertes oder tritt uns als ein Sollen gegenüber, das sich nie auf ein Seiendes zurückführen läßt» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:6).
  • 7 «das immanente Objekt und das Bewußtseinssubjekt gehören notwendig zusammen» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:42).
  • 8 «das erkenntnistheoretische Subjekt als Form jedes Subjekts oder als ‹Bewußtsein überhaupt› weder eine transzendente noch eine immanente Realität ist» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:77).
  • 9 «Wenn man von dem Subjekt S alles abstreift, was empirisch ist, so bleibt nicht etwa als Grenzbegriff das Bewußtsein und sei es auch nur das bloße Bewußtsein im Gegensatz zu allen Inhalten, sondern man gelangt zum reinen Nichts. Es bleibt vom Subjekt nichts übrig, das man als Träger einer Wirklichkeit ansehen könnte.» (Christiansen 1911, 82)
  • 10 «Die Form der Subjektheit dagegen, die in jedem Subjekt, also auch im empirischen steckt, kann überhaupt nicht als Teilstück der Wirklichkeit gelten.» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:82)
  • 11 «Es erweist sich vielmehr der Standpunkt der Immanenz, solange wir vom vorstellenden Bewußtsein oder Subjekt ausgehen, als der einzig mögliche. Doch ist auch dies Ergebnis nur vorläufig.» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:94)
  • 12 «Nähmen wir keine transzendente Realität an, so hätte der ganze Bewußtseinsinhalt keine Ursache, also für den Standpunkt der Immanenz wäre die Wirklichkeit so viel wie ein Wunder.» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:96)
  • 13 «da dieser den Sinn hat, die Wirklichkeit, in der wir leben, gerade nicht zur bloßen ‹Erscheinung› eines dahinter liegenden metaphysischen Wesens verflüchtigen zu lassen» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:103).
  • 14 «Die idealistische Transzendentalphilosophie lehnt jede Verwandtschaft mit metaphy|sischen Spielereien, die den Namen Traumidealismus oder Illusionismus verdienen, auf das entschiedenste ab, und sie hat daher das Recht, alle gegen diese Spielereien gerichteten und sehr wohlfeilen Argumente zu ignorieren.» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:104)
  • 15 «Der Standpunkt der Immanenz mache die Wirklichkeit zu einem Haufen regelloser Fragmente.» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:108)
  • 16 «Das Bewußtsein selbst aber sei, für sich betrachtet oder abgesehen von den ihm immanenten Objekten, kein zeitliches Ding, vor oder nach dem etwas sein könne, und von dem sich sagen lasse, daß es Unterbrechungen erleide, sondern es bedeute lediglich die Form der Bewußtheit oder den begrifflich isolierten Subjektfaktor, der zu jedem Bewußtseinsinhalt gehört, und sei daher unwirklich, wie alle Formen ohne den zu ihnen gehörigen Inhalt.» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:117)
  • 17 «Wer lediglich ein individuelles Bewußtsein und trotzdem keine von ihm unab|hängige, also in diesem Sinne ‹transzendente› Realität anerkennen will, spricht damit die logische Absurdität des Solipsismus aus und vermag niemals über sie hinaus|zukommen.» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:118–19)
  • 18 «Nur die vom erkennenden Subjekt und nicht vom ganzen Menschen unabhängige Realität, die Gegenstand der Erkenntnis sein soll, darf von der Erkenntnistheorie in Zweifel gezogen werden.» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:126)
  • 19 «Für die Psychologie bliebe allein der Standpunkt der Immanenz übrig.» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:128–29)
  • 20 «Das Wort Bewußtsein soll, wie wir wissen, nur die Seinsart alles unmittelbar Gegebenen bestimmen, und das Gegebene in seiner Totalität als Psychisches charakterisieren, das hieße eine ontologische Umdeutung seines Wesens vornehmen, für die jede Begründung fehlt.» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:134)
  • 21 «mein erkenntnistheoretischer Standpunkt mit dem Realismus der Einzelforschung sich in voller Harmonie befindet» (Rickert 2018 [1915], 2/2:10).

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