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(2002) Hermeneutic philosophy of science, van Gogh's eyes, and God, Dordrecht, Springer.
Human agency and the social sciences
from contextual phenomenology to genealogy
pp. 187-194
Husserl established the standard phenomenological approach to the social sciences with his claim that transcendental phenomenology determines the universal a priori and fundamental grounds for all objective descriptions and claims. Such a position, however, appears to leave phenomenology open to the charge that it presupposes some kind of disinterested observer, who offers non-contextual, value-free descriptions of our cognitive structure, motives, values, social practices. It could be objected that this, in turn, prevents Husserlian phenomenology from properly taking account of the socio-historical conditions under which human action occurs and of the explanation of such actions offered by the social sciences.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-1767-0_15
Full citation:
(2002)., Human agency and the social sciences: from contextual phenomenology to genealogy, in B. Babich (ed.), Hermeneutic philosophy of science, van Gogh's eyes, and God, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 187-194.
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