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It is a point which has frequently been made by Bertrand Russell that the fortunes of metaphysics in modern times have been largely determined by the omission to consider any other but substantival and adjectival universals¹⁶⁴. The failure to recognise that there also might be other kinds of universals led to the conclusion that all propositions can be regarded as attributing a property to a single thing. In particular, propositions expressing relations "xRy' were reduced to subject-predicate propositions "ϕ x', where "ϕ' is a name for the complex or relational property of "having R to y'. This view had far-reaching consequences and lent support to monistic metaphysics. Since every object stands in some relations to outside things, nothing can be adequately described unless it is considered as a part of a whole and in its manifold relations to every other object. Moreover, nothing except the whole of reality is self-contained. Finally, no proposition is true unless it is entailed by propositions about reality as a whole. Some metaphysical views, which ascribe to reality otherwise unjustifiable fundamental characteristics, result from an incorrect logical analysis of language and an inadequate theory of universals.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-3636-8_29

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