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Maimon's subversion of Kant's critique of pure reason

there are no synthetic a priori judgments in physics

Gideon Freudenthal

pp. 144-175

Maimon characterized his philosophical position as "rational dogmatism and empirical skepticism" (Tr, II, 436). In this paper I concentrate on the latter half of this description, and argue that Maimon's empirical skepticism subverts and jeopardizes Kant's project in the Critique of Pure Reason.1

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2936-9_7

Full citation:

Freudenthal, G. (2003)., Maimon's subversion of Kant's critique of pure reason: there are no synthetic a priori judgments in physics, in G. Freudenthal (ed.), Salomon Maimon: rational dogmatist, empirical skeptic, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 144-175.

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