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(2014) Synthese 191 (3).
Probabilism, the view that agents have numerical degrees of beliefs that conform to the axioms of probability, has been defended by the vast majority of its proponents by way of either of two arguments, the Dutch Book Argument and the Representation Theorems Argument. In this paper I argue that both arguments are flawed. The Dutch Book Argument is based on an unwarranted, ad hoc premise that cannot be dispensed with. The Representation Theorems Argument hinges on an invalid implication.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0286-0
Full citation:
Secchi, L. (2014). The main two arguments for probabilism are flawed. Synthese 191 (3), pp. 287-295.
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