Repository | Journal | Volume | Articles
(2006) Synthese 152 (1).
Philosophers have often attempted to use counterfactual conditionals to analyze probability. This article focuses on counterfactual analyzes of epistemic probability by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen. I argue that a certain type of counterfactual situation creates problems for these analyses. I then argue that Plantinga’s intuition about the role of warrant in epistemic probability is mistaken. Both van Inwagen’s and Plantinga’s intuitions about epistemic probability are flawed.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-005-1332-3
Full citation:
Otte, R. (2006). Counterfactuals and epistemic probability. Synthese 152 (1), pp. 81-93.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.