(2017) Husserl Studies 33 (1).

Representation and regress

Maiya Jordan

pp. 19-43

I defend a Husserlian account of self-consciousness against representationalist accounts: higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism. Of these, self-representationalism is the harder to refute since, unlike higher-order representationalism, it does not incur a regress of self-conscious acts. However, it incurs a regress of intentional contents. I consider, and reject, five strategies for avoiding this regress of contents. I conclude that the regress is inherent to self-representationalism. I close by showing how this incoherence obtrudes in what must be the self-representationalist’s account of the phenomenology of experience.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-016-9203-y

Full citation [Harvard style]:

Jordan, M. (2017). Representation and regress. Husserl Studies 33 (1), pp. 19-43.

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