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(2014) Husserl Studies 30 (1).

Perceptual transparency and perceptual constancy

Jan Almäng

pp. 1-19

A central topic in discussions about qualia concerns their purported transparency. According to transparency theorists, an experience is transparent in the sense that the subject having the experience is aware of nothing but the intended object of the experience. In this paper this notion is criticized for failing to account for the dynamical aspects of perception. A key assumption in the paper is that perceptual content has a certain temporal depth, in the sense that each act of perception can present an object as extended in time and that objects can be perceived as persisting through time. An object that is seen as persisting through time is often seen as constant and unchanging, even though the presentation of it is changing. In this paper it is argued that in order to account for these cases of perceptual constancy, we must distinguish between the awareness of having perceived that an object has a property at a certain point in time, and perceptually intending that it has that property at that point in time. Consequently, we must in at least some instances be aware of something more than the object of the experience. But precisely this distinction is rejected by the transparency theory.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-013-9142-9

Full citation [Harvard style]:

Almäng, J. (2014). Perceptual transparency and perceptual constancy. Husserl Studies 30 (1), pp. 1-19.

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