How is a phenomenological reflection-model of self-consciousness possible?
a Husserlian response to E. Tugendhat's semantic approach to self-consciousness
The problem of self-consciousness has been an essential one for philosophy since the onset of modernity. Both E. Tugendhat and the Heidelberg School represented by D. Henrich have reflected critically upon the traditional theory of self-consciousness, and both have revealed the circular dilemma of the "reflection-model" adopted by the traditional theory. In order to avoid the dilemma, they both proposed substitute formulas, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages. Husserl also paid particular attention to the traditional theory of self-consciousness in his phenomenology. Through the distinctions of "primal consciousness" and "reflection," Husserl explored the core problem of the traditional theory of self-consciousness in two different dimensions. In his critique, Husserl clarified the founding relation between primal consciousness and reflection, and in contrast to Tugendhat's semantic approach, he developed a new reflection-model of self-consciousness which effectively avoids the circular dilemma of the traditional theory and does not narrow the problem domain of that theory.
Zhang, W. (2016). How is a phenomenological reflection-model of self-consciousness possible?: a Husserlian response to E. Tugendhat's semantic approach to self-consciousness. Husserl Studies 32 (1), pp. 47-66.
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