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(2008) Husserl Studies 24 (3).
Consciousness is not a bag
immanence, transcendence, and constitution in the idea of phenomenology
John Brough
pp. 177-191
A fruitful way to approach The Idea of Phenomenology is through Husserl's claim that consciousness is not a bag, box, or any other kind of container. The bag conception, which dominated much of modern philosophy, is rooted in the idea that philosophy is restricted to investigating only what is really immanent to consciousness, such as acts and sensory contents. On this view, what Husserl called "the riddle of transcendence" can never be solved. The phenomenological reduction, as Husserl develops it in The Idea of Phenomenology, opened up a new and broader sense of immanence that embraces the transcendent, making it possible both to solve the riddle and to escape the bag conception once and for all. The essay will discuss ways in which this new conception of immanence is tied to the key Husserlian themes of appearance, phenomenon, essence, seeing or intuiting, and constitution.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s10743-008-9045-3
Full citation:
Brough, J. (2008). Consciousness is not a bag: immanence, transcendence, and constitution in the idea of phenomenology. Husserl Studies 24 (3), pp. 177-191.
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