Seeing what is not seen

Gabrielle Jackson

pp. 503-519

This paper connects ideas from twentieth century Gestalt psychology, experiments in vision science, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception. I propose that when we engage in simple sensorimotor tasks whose successful completion is open, our behavior may be motivated by practical perceptual awareness alone, responding to invariant features of the perceptual field that are invisible to other forms of perceptual awareness. On this view, we see more than we think we see, as evidenced by our skillful bodily behavior.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-017-9524-0

Full citation:

Jackson, (2018). Seeing what is not seen. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3), pp. 503-519.

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