Empathy and second-person methodology

Natalie Depraz

pp. 447-459

How the phenomenology of empathy in Husserl and beyond and the second-person approach of cognition are able to mutually enrich and constrain each other? Whereas the intersubjective empathy is limited to face-to-face inter-individual relational experiences or, when socially embedded, results a non-individualized understanding of others in general, the second person approach of cognition opens the way for a plural relational yet individualized understanding of the other. I would like to show in this paper how the integration of both phenomenological and cognitive fields paves the way for the more encompassing description of intersubjective experience as a "relational multiplicity," which I will ultimately describe through the empirical practice of an emergency psychiatric unit.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11007-012-9223-z

Full citation [Harvard style]:

Depraz, N. (2012). Empathy and second-person methodology. Continental Philosophy Review 45 (3), pp. 447-459.

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