146549

Springer, Dordrecht

2018

215 pages

ISBN 978-3-319-98644-9

Contributions to Phenomenology
vol. 96

Third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative

Edited by

Patrizia Pedrini, Julie Kirsch

In recent years, the idea that each person is in a privileged position to acquire knowledge about her own mental states has come under attack. A growing body of empirical research has cast doubt upon the existence of what philosophers call "first person self-knowledge', i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is often thought to be immediate, transparent, and authoritative. This line of thought has led some philosophers to claim that what seems to be "first-person self-knowledge' is really just"third-person self-knowledge,' i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is inferential, opaque, and fallible. This book discusses challenges for first-person knowledge and explores the true nature of third-person knowledge.

Introduction

Kirsch Julie; Pedrini Patrizia

1-12

Open Access Link
Self-knowing interpreters

Coliva Annalisa

13-29

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Extended self-knowledge

Carter Adam; Pritchard Duncan

31-49

Open Access Link
The "crux' of internal promptings

Pedrini Patrizia

51-72

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Interpreting intuitions

McGahhey Marcus; van Leeuwen Neil

73-98

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Interpreting things past

Kirsch Julie

99-113

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Self-interpretation as software

Zawidzki Tadeusz

115-144

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Identification and self-knowledge

Malatesti Luca; Čeč Filip

177-189

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