Dasein as transcendence in Heidegger and the critique of Husserl
In this paper, I shall examine the evolution of Heidegger's concept of "transcendence' as it appears in Being and Time (1927), "On the Essence of Ground' (1928) and related texts from the late 1920s in relation to his rethinking of subjectivity and intentionality. Heidegger defines Being as "transcendence' in Being and Time and reinterprets intentionality in terms of the transcendence of Dasein. In the critical epistemological tradition of philosophy stemming from Kant, as in Husserl, transcendence and immanence are key notions (see Husserl The Idea of Phenomenology, 1907 and Ideas I, 1913). Indeed, "transcendence in immanence' is a leitmotif of Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl discusses transcendence in some detail in Cartesian Meditations § 11 in a manner which is not dissimilar to Heidegger. Heidegger is critical of Husserl's understanding of consciousness and intentionality and deliberately chooses to discuss transcendence as an exceptional domain for the discussion of beings in his "On the Essence of Ground,' his submission to Husserl's seventieth-birthday Festschrift. Despite his championing of a new concept of transcendence in the late 1920s, Heidegger effectively abandons the term during the early 1930s. In this paper, I shall explore Heidegger articulation of his new ontological conception of finite transcendence and compare it with Husserl's conception of the transcendence of the ego in order to get clearer what is at stake in Heidegger's conceptions of subjectivity, Dasein and transcendence.
Moran, D. (2015)., Dasein as transcendence in Heidegger and the critique of Husserl, in T. Georgakis & P. J. Ennis (eds.), Heidegger in the twenty-first century, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 23-45.
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