Is Derrida's view of ideal being rationally defensible?
In this paper I shall inquire to what extent there may be good reasons for holding (or rejecting) Derrida's view on the existence and nature of ideal being or universals. That is, is his view true or is it false? And are there considerations which can be stated in the form of propositions (indicative sentences) that can be known to be true and that logically entail, or render significantly probable, either the view of ideal being which Derrida maintains or its negation? What would be the results of an appraisal of Derrick's position on this matter from the viewpoint of standard logic? I share Newton Garver's "... worry... that Derrida may not have left himself any ground on which to stand and may be enticing us along a path to nowhere…."1
Willard, D. (1995)., Is Derrida's view of ideal being rationally defensible?, in J. C. Evans (ed.), Derrida and phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 23-41.
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