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(1991) Presence and coincidence, Dordrecht, Springer.
We have already learnt that there can be no such thing as a phenomenological constitution of the transcendental ego. We have also seen that the ultimately constitutive flux of consciousness is also exempt from the possibility of a constitutional analysis. Furthermore, we have been able to identify the condition to which this impossibility can be attributed, namely, the condition of coincidence. The Transcendental ego is the self, the flux is the self - and it is for this very reason that there can be no constitution of the ego or of the flux by the self. More specifically, the (transcendental) ego is the self in its static abstraction from the basis of its being, whereas the (transcendental) flux is the self in its connection with the dynamic process whereby it alters and transforms itself.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-3754-6_6
Full citation:
Macann, C. (1991). The impossibility of a phenomenological constitution of the own body, in Presence and coincidence, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 85-102.