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(1974) James and Husserl, Dordrecht, Springer.

The pragmatic theory of truth

Richard Cobb-Stevens

pp. 157-173

James at first envisaged pragmatism as "… a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable." 1 In a passage which anticipates the later development of the falsification principle in British linguistic philosophy, he affirms that the pragmatic method is designed to interpret every notion or theory in terms of its practical consequences. If two rival views or conflicting concepts lead to an identical practical conclusion, then we may assume that they both express the same meaning from different perspectives and that, therefore, all further controversy is fruitless. "Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other's being right." 2 In order to illustrate the efficacy of this pragmatic rule, James suggests the following example. Let us suppose that a squirrel is clinging to one side of a tree trunk, while a man is standing on the opposite side of the same tree. If the man attempts to catch sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly around the tree, it often happens that he fails to succeed because the squirrel always manages to keep the tree-trunk between himself and his frustrated pursuer. The question then arises whether the man may be said to have gone around the squirrel or not.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-2058-9_9

Full citation:

Cobb-Stevens, R. (1974). The pragmatic theory of truth, in James and Husserl, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 157-173.

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