Repository | Journal | Volume | Articles
(2016) European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 8 (2).
The anticipated past in historical inquiry
A. O, Lovejoy, C. I. lewis and E. Wind on accounting for knowledge of the past within a pragmatist theory
Stefan Niklas
In this paper I argue that, from a pragmatist point of view, to know the past means to anticipate it. Accordingly, historical inquiry is directed towards the future, namely the future of the past as known. I develop this argument in three steps: (I.) Starting with A. O. Lovejoy’s criticism of Dewey’s anticipatory theory of knowledge I defend the basic claim that all knowledge, including knowledge of the past, is anticipatory (i.e. directed at future consequences). Lovejoy’s criticism shows that Dewey’s statements invite misunderstandings, which have to be removed. (II.) I then turn to C. I. Lewis’ enhanced outline of a pragmatist theory of knowledge. Lewis provides epistemological arguments regarding the structural features of knowledge of the past and argues knowledge that is gained by the past’s present effects. (III.) Finally, I turn to a notable essay by E. Wind in which he stresses the intrusive and future-oriented character of historical inquiry: Documents are used as instruments for intruding into the past, asking how the past will be understood in the light of new or reconsidered evidence. This process involves anticipating the effects that a different past will have on those affected by the history in question.
Publication details
DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.630
Full citation:
Niklas, S. (2016). The anticipated past in historical inquiry: A. O, Lovejoy, C. I. lewis and E. Wind on accounting for knowledge of the past within a pragmatist theory. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 8 (2), pp. n/a.
This document is available at an external location. Please follow the link below. Hold the CTRL button to open the link in a new window.
