Fichte and Kant on reason's final ends and highest ideas
In this paper, I argue that Fichte’s account of pure reason and its supreme self-wrought Idea is, in its transcendental essentials, very much modeled on Kant’s. The key difference between their positions, I suggest, is simply that Fichte operates with a more abstract understanding of the transcendentally basic elements of finite rationality; consequently, he arrives at a conceptually more concentrated understanding of pure reason’s preeminent Idea. In section one, I supply some context for that comparison. In section two, I recount Fichte’s depiction of “the I as an Idea” and note some importantly related concepts and claims. In section three, I examine a pair of interestingly different approaches taken by Kant to understanding and identifying the Ideas engendered by reason’s basic aims and operations. Finally, in section four, I suggest that the Jena Wissenschaftslehre reflects Fichte’s tacit appropriation of the transcendentally more fundamental of those two Kantian approaches.
Hoeltzel, S. (2018). Fichte and Kant on reason's final ends and highest ideas. Revista de estud(i)os sobre Fichte 16, pp. n/a.
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