Repository | Book | Chapter

In the first investigation of his Logische Untersuchungen ¹ Edmund Husserl puts forth an analysis of expression from the standpoint of mental acts. This rather unusual procedure results in a curious and interesting account of the relation between the signification (Bedeutung) of an expression and its object or referent (Gegenstand). My purpose is to examine the aspects of this account which help determine where Husserl stands with respect to the so-called referential theory of meaning (signification).² A proponent of this theory, I shall suppose, subscribes to the general statement that "for an expression to have meaning is for it to refer to something other than itself," and to the specific view that "the meaning of an expression is that to which the expression refers." ³ Now Husserl denies — at least verbally — both the specific view and the statement that an expression's referring to an object gives it a signification; hence he appears to deny in toto the referential theory of meaning. I shall argue, however, that he has no justification for either denial.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-1055-9_9

Full citation: