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(1973) Explorations in phenomenology, Den Haag, Nijhoff.
In his brief addendum to Section 60 of his Formal and Transcendental Logic,1 Husserl stresses the central place of a theory of evidence, due to whose development alone "has a seriously scientific transcendental philosophy ("critique of reason'2) become possible, as well as, at bottom, a seriously scientific psychology, conceived centrally as the science of the proper essence of the psychic . . .." 3 Only a full theory of evidence, developed on the basis of a thorough criticism of "reason," can properly yield a serious theory and approach to consciousness. He also emphasizes many times the fundamental failure of traditional philosophy to develop a proper and adequate conception of evidence. A brief rehearsal of this, and a systematic placement of the criticism of evidence in the theory of consciousness, will help to show the historical and vital urgency of those issues.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-1999-6_7
Full citation:
Zaner, R. (1973)., Reflections on evidence and criticism in the theory of consciousness, in D. Carr & E. Casey (eds.), Explorations in phenomenology, Den Haag, Nijhoff, pp. 184-207.
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