Carnap's Aufbau and physicalism
what does the "mutual reducibility" of psychological and physical objects amount to?
The present paper is part of a larger project of investigating how far puzzling questions about Carnap's philosophical deflationism – as expressed most prominently in "Empricism, Semantics and Ontology"1 – can be answered by reference to his own preferred position in areas upon which this meta-philosophical position can be expected to have a bearing. For that project the explorations below provide a starting point; on the present occasion they will, I hope, be found to be of independent interest. At issue is the question of what makes Carnap's The Logical Structure of the World (the Aufbau) a pre-physicalist work.
Uebel, T. (2014)., Carnap's Aufbau and physicalism: what does the "mutual reducibility" of psychological and physical objects amount to?, in M. C. Galavotti, E. Nemeth & F. Stadler (eds.), European philosophy of science, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 45-56.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.