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(1998) Game theory, experience, rationality, Dordrecht, Springer.
Since von Neumann and Morgenstern initiated the field of game theory,1 it has often proved of great value for the quantitative description and understanding of competition and co-operation between individuals. Game theory focusses on two questions: 1. Which is the optimal strategy in a given situation? 2. What is the dynamics of strategy choices in cases of repeatedly interacting individuals? In this connection game dynamical equations2 find a steadily increasing interest. Although they agree with the replicator equations of evolution theory (cf. Sec. II), they cannot be justified in the same way. Therefore, we will be looking for a foundation of the game dynamical equations which is based on individual actions and decisions (cf. Sec. IV).
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-1654-3_18
Full citation:
Helbing, D. (1998)., Microscopic foundation of stochastic game dynamical equations, in W. Leinfellner & E. Köhler (eds.), Game theory, experience, rationality, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 211-224.
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