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(1990) Wittgenstein — eine neubewertung/Wittgenstein — towards a re-evaluation, Dordrecht, Springer.
Despite his avowed anti-essentialism, Wittgenstein is an essentialist — about philosophy itself. "Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday." (P.I. 38) The philosopher takes a phrase from its home, working environment and idles with it. For example, he asks "Does the fact that when in the past I have touched things which are red hot, I have been burned, provide any reason, grounds, evidence for thinking that that will happen again?" Unable to see how what has happened in the past can provide any guide to what may happen in the future — without making an assumption that begs the question — he concludes that it cannot. Of course, his philosophical scepticism has no consequences for the philosopher's behaviour, i.e., he is as reluctant as anyone else to touch fires, glowing hot-plates, etc. (— and if he were not, he would be mad.) So, the verbal expression of his "philosophical", i.e., quite unreal doubt, is mere verbal play.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-30086-2_24
Full citation:
Radford, C. (1990)., Wittgenstein and philosophy, in R. Haller & J. L. Brandl (eds.), Wittgenstein — eine neubewertung/Wittgenstein — towards a re-evaluation, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 253-260.
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