Repository | Book | Chapter
(2013) The self in question, Dordrecht, Springer.
Memory and self-consciousness (2)
the conceptual holism of memory and personal identity, and the unity of consciousness
Andy Hamilton
pp. 75-104
This chapter continues the response to the dilemma previously discussed. If we define what it is for a subject to remember in a way that allows that they could be distinct from the subject whose experiences or deeds are being remembered, it seems that memory cannot constitute a sufficient condition for personal identity. But if we define what it is for a subject to remember in a way that rules out that possibility, it then seems that our definition must rest on a prior understanding of personal identity, and so the proposed account becomes circular.
Publication details
Full citation:
Hamilton, A. (2013). Memory and self-consciousness (2): the conceptual holism of memory and personal identity, and the unity of consciousness, in The self in question, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 75-104.